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Abstract
Soaring energy prices since fall 2021 have prompted European governments to introduce
policy measures to support households and businesses. In this paper, we employ the MATRIX
model, a multi-sector and multi-agent macroeconomic model calibrated on the Euro Area, to
analyze the economic and distributional effects of different types of macro-stabilization policies
in response to energy price shocks. Simulation results show that, in the absence of stabilization
policies, an increase in fossil fuel price would lead to a sharp growth in price inflation and a
severe contraction in real GDP, followed by a slow but steady recovery. We find no significant
effects of generalized tax cuts and household subsidies, while firm subsidies promote a faster
recovery but at the expense of greater financial instability in the medium term due to the resulting
market distortions. If timely adopted, government-funded energy tariff reduction is the most
effective policy in mitigating GDP losses at relatively low public costs, especially if coupled
with an extra-profit tax on energy firms. Energy entrepreneurs benefit from rising fuel prices
in all policy scenarios, but to a lesser extent under energy tariff cuts and windfall profits tax,
favouring, in that case, workers and downstream firms owners.
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1.

Introduction

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy has been shaken by another shock that
risks undermining the efforts undertaken by public authorities to ensure a proper recovery – the
energy crisis. Driven by turmoil in natural gas markets, fossil fuel prices started rising in the second
half of 2021 and rapidly reflected in higher electricity prices for households and business around the
world (Schnabel, 2022). The global energy crisis was triggered by several factors pertaining to both
the demand and supply side of energy markets (Alvarez and Molnar, 2021) such as the extraordinary
rapid post-COVID recovery; a cold and long 2021-22 winter in the Northern Hemisphere; a weakerthan-expected increase in energy supply due to several weather-related events (e.g., droughts in
Brazil that curtailed hydropower output, low wind generation in Northern Europe); the decline in
fossil fuel investment, partly due to increasingly stringent climate policies, without an adequate rise
in clean energy supply, resulting in an increasing reliance on natural gas as an intermediate fuel;
not least, relevant geopolitical strife, particularly the Russo-Ukraine war starting in February 2022
(Liadze et al., 2022; Kilian and Plante, 2022).
The European Area is sensitive to all these causations because of the severe impact of the
pandemic, the historical reliance on energy imports and the development of ambitious climate
packages such as the “Fit for 55”. As a result, European governments adopted several policy
measures to shield households and firms from surging energy prices. These came in different forms,
such as reduced energy taxes, retail price regulations, transfers to vulnerable groups and windfall
profits taxes (see Table 1, source: Sgaravatti et al., 2021). The rationale for public intervention
might even go beyond the containment of an economic downturn, counteracting, for example,
unintended social consequences which risk undermining internal cohesion (Douenne and Fabre, 2022).
Nonetheless, those policies could be costly, and their application might bring side effects to the rest
of the economy. That is even more so in times of economic uncertainty, where it could be challenging
to disentangle the policies’ transmission channels and predict potential effects on different sectors of
the economy.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the economic and distributional consequences of different
types of macroeconomic stabilization policies in response to energy price shocks. We do this by
employing an extended version of the MATRIX model described in Ciola et al. (2022b), that is a
multi-sector multi-agent macroeconomic model with an endogenous energy sector. The MATRIX
model features a corporate sector, including heterogeneous consumption, capital and energy firms
with interlocked input demands; a banking sector with heterogeneous banks; an exogenous fossil
fuel sector (e.g., oil or natural gas); and a public sector, composed of a government and a central
bank. Accordingly, the model can account for the relationship between the real and financial side of
the economy, as well as the role played by fiscal and monetary policies. Moreover, it can be used
to investigate the effects of an energy crisis captured by means of an exogenous shift in the price
or quantity of the fossil fuel employed by the energy sector1 . Contrary to the standard general
equilibrium models, the agent-based framework allows to analyse not only the short-run impacts of
the energy shock, but also the second order effects resulting from decentralized market interactions,
feedback loops and out-of-equilibrium dynamics. For this reason, we believe the MATRIX model is
a suitable tool to analyse the complexity of energy shocks and related macro-stabilization policies.
In this paper we extend the original model along two main directions. First, we re-calibrate the
model to represent the macroeconomic behaviour of the Euro Area, while the original version focus
on the US economy. Second, we implement a variety of policy experiments taking inspiration from
the actual policies introduced by European governments in response to the current energy crisis,
1 For a systematic analysis of the economic and distributional effects of different types of energy price and quantity
shocks within the MATRIX model, see Ciola et al. (2022b)
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Table 1: National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices.
Country/Policy
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

Reduced
energy tax

Retail/Wholesale
price regulation

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓✓
✓

Transfers to
vulnerables

Business
support

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Mandate to
SOEs

Other

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Windfall
profits tax

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

Source: Bruegel Datasets (Sgaravatti et al., 2022). Last update: 11 May 2022.
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as presented in table 1. In particular, we consider five different policy scenarios: (i) generalized
income tax reduction; (ii) household subsidy scheme; (iii) firm subsidy scheme (iv) extra-profit tax;
(v) energy tariff reduction.
Simulation results show that, in the absence of stabilization policies, an energy price shock would
lead to a sharp increase in price inflation and a lower real GDP, associated with spikes in firms’
defaults and unemployment rate. We do not find significant effects of generalized tax cuts and
consumer subsidy schemes, whereas firm subsidies can prompt a faster recovery, but at the expense
of greater financial instability in the medium run due to the resulting market distortions. If timely
adopted, government-funded energy tariff reduction is the most effective policy in mitigating GDP
losses at relatively low public costs, especially if coupled with an extra-profit tax on energy firms.
In terms of distributional impacts, we find that energy entrepreneurs benefit from a surge in fossil
fuel price in all policy scenarios, but less so under energy tariff reduction and extra-profit tax, in
favour of workers and downstream firms’ owners.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the macroeconomic literature on energy
shocks and related policy answers. Section 3 briefly describes the structure of the MATRIX model
and the proposed extensions. Section 4 presents the design of policy experiments and discusses the
simulation results. Lastly, Section 5 concludes by providing policy recommendations.

2.

Literature review

The literature on energy shocks has blossomed in the aftermath of the oil crisis of the 1970s, mostly
focusing on the nature of the shock and its macroeconomic implications. (Eastwood, 1992). It has
been shown that energy price increases can cause a decline in output and employment (Bohi, 2017)
and can be linked historically with recessions and inflation bursts (Kilian, 2008; Hamilton, 2008).
Pindyck (1980) stresses that the channels through which higher energy prices affect the economy
are essentially twofold: a direct cost channel, due to the role of energy as a productive input with
limited substitution elasticities; an indirect cost channel, as the rise in energy prices eventually
translates into higher general inflation, hence harming consumers’ purchasing power. Nevertheless,
their effects on the economy are puzzling because of the low share of energy in the production.
This motivated researchers to identify alternative explanations, ranging from collusive practices
in the related market to their relevance in the provision of capital sector services (Rotemberg and
Woodford, 1996; Finn, 2000).
Some authors have stressed the importance of characterizing the nature of energy shocks in
order to better understand the resulting macroeconomic consequences. For instance, oil price shocks
could have different impacts depending on whether they are triggered by demand-side or supply-side
factors (Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Herrera et al., 2019; Herrera and Rangaraju, 2019). van de Ven
and Fouquet (2017) investigates the historical impacts of energy price shocks on UK GDP over the
last 300 years, discovering that the impacts have changed over time depending on the nature of
shocks and the type of energy source predominantly used. In particular, they find that the impacts of
supply shocks rose with the increasing dependence on coal, and declined with the partial transition
to oil. However, the transition from exporting coal to importing oil increased the negative impacts
of demand shocks, suggesting that the system resilience to energy shocks has not improved with
economic development. The transition to renewable sources, the integration of different national
markets and the adoption of a well diversified energy mix are highly recommended policies aimed at
improving an economy’s vulnerability and resilience to shocks in the medium-long run.
Beyond these structural interventions in the energy market, some works have examined the role
of timely fiscal and monetary policy measures to alleviate the short-run economic costs of higher
energy prices for households and firms (Hickman et al., 1987), which is more in tune with the scope
4
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of this paper. The analysis of fiscal policy in response to energy shocks, like tax cuts or firms
subsidies, largely overlaps with standard macroeconomic analysis of other shock types. Nonetheless,
a peculiarity of this field is related to the so-called windfall or extra profits tax. Verbruggen (2008)
highlights some uncertainty in the taxonomy regarding the windfall profits tax and proposes to
separate the components related to rent skimming, monopoly or swindle profits from the actual
unearned and unanticipated gains, the so-called “windfall profits”. The latter has been recently
studied in the context of developing countries in relation to sudden resource availability (Dagher
et al., 2010) or emission trading schemes (Woerdman et al., 2009). Yet, the measure was originally
conceived in the context of the US energy crisis of the 1970s (McIntyre, 1980), resulting in the Crude
Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 (Philip K. Verleger, 1980). The tax was in reality an excise tax
and was eventually repelled in 1988 for different reasons: (i) a lower than expected tax revenues
due to falling oil prices; (ii) administrative and compliance burden; (iii) a suspected negative effect
on domestic oil production. Lazzari (2006) claims that a pure corporate income surtax on crude
oil producers is more efficient than an excise tax as it allows to recoup any recent windfalls with
less adverse economic effects. In terms of distributional impacts, Alexeev and Zakharov (2022) find
that windfall profits had increased income inequality and benefited the wealthiest quantile of the
population in regions with more intense rent-seeking. Also for this reason, in 2021 the European
Commission advocated the proposal of transferring the proceeds from an excess profit tax on energy
companies to the vulnerable groups in order to contain the negative economic and distributional
effects of the energy crisis (Batlle et al., 2022).
Monetary policy is another relevant tool available to the policymaker to alleviate the economic
impact of energy shocks (Bernanke et al., 1997; Binder, 2018). De et al. (2022) study the effects of
three types of oil shocks on the US economy from 1978 to 2017, finding that monetary authorities
tightened monetary policy to mitigate the inflationary pressure of unanticipated oil demand shocks.
However, Pindyck (1980) states that the complete accommodation of the indirect costs might not
always be the most optimal answer. Although the current crisis might not justify long-term inflation
worries, a change in agent expectations of future prices could trigger a wage-price spiral that would
inflict significant short-term economic pains (Kilian and Zhou, 2021). In this case, the policymaker
should consider a prudent monetary policy to ensure price stability, but taking into account potential
output losses. Indeed, as Bohi (2017) argues, the recessions following the oil shocks of the 1970s
were rather due to the tightening of monetary policy than the oil shocks per se.
Fiscal policies, such as tax cuts and subsidies, seem to find a more relevant place in the 2021
energy crisis. Indeed, in response to the rise in natural gas and energy prices, most European
governments struggle to operationalize sufficient alternative energy sources, bringing risks of supply
disruptions (Alvarez and Molnar, 2021). More direct and faster measures (compared to energy
efficiency investments) are then a viable solution to cope with short-run economic costs, as manifested
by the list of national policies adopted by European countries described in table 1.
In the last decades, the economic effects of energy shocks and related stabilization policies have
been object of study within the macroeconomic modelling literature as well, mainly through Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.
Jacquinot et al. (2009) explore the links between oil prices and inflation by means of a DSGE
model calibrated on the Euro area, finding that the strength of the link varies depending on the type
of identified oil shock and the time horizon under consideration. Employing Bayesian methods with
a DSGE model, Balke et al. (2010) finds that domestic shocks to productivity and preferences might
amplify the effects of exogenous oil shocks: supply and demand shocks could have different impacts
on GDP, but without the interaction with domestic factors, the effect of the shock could be very mild.
Nakov and Pescatori (2010) find evidence that a reduced oil share on GDP contributed to the Great
Moderation. Plante (2014) investigates the macroeconomic impacts of fuel subsidies in a small open
5
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economy model, finding that, regardless of how the subsidies are financed, they introduce market
distortions and reduce aggregate welfare, both in net oil importing or exporting countries. Vásconez
et al. (2015) analyse the stagflationary impact of oil price shocks with a NK-DSGE model, finding
that increased energy efficiency attenuates the negative effect of an oil shock. Zhao et al. (2016)
examines the impacts of different types of oil shocks in an open economy DSGE for China. They state
that policies for controlling inflation should consider the global aspect of the shock, and diversify
the energy sources. Huynh (2017) develops a New Keynesian model with an endogenous energy
production to investigate the monetary policy answers to four types of price shocks, highlighting the
role of structural rigidities in the shock transmission. Balke and Brown (2018) develop an estimated
DSGE model for the US economy to evaluate how U.S. economic activity responds to oil price
shocks, finding that the elasticity of GDP to oil price changes due to oil supply shocks.
Considering the CGE literature, Aydın and Acar (2011) study the impacts of oil shocks on the
Turkish economy, finding a harmful reduction of consumption and income, but do not consider
reactive policies targeted at consumers and firms, but rather a liberalization of the oil sector and
investments in alternative energy sources. Doroodian and Boyd (2003) examines in a model of the
US if an oil shock would pose inflation under different scenarios of technical progress, discovering a
weak and diluting connection. Liu et al. (2015) develops a financial CGE for the Chinese economy
and analyses monetary policy answers to oil shocks of different magnitudes, finding a trade-off
between reserve ratio and interest rate policy on social stability.
As we have seen, the questions concerning energy shocks and related policy responses have
been addressed by means of different methodologies, but mostly from an aggregate perspective, e.g.
Pindyck (1980); Balke et al. (2010). However, the complex interrelation between the energy sector
and the economy should be considered when evaluating the macroeconomic impact of energy price
increases. This can be done in a micro-founded macroeconomic model with heterogeneous interacting
agents capable of capturing out-of-equilibrium dynamics, distributional effects and feedback loops
between different sectors. Moreover, the lack of timely data might prevent empirical assessment of
short-terms impacts of stabilization policies in response to energy shocks. That would require a
computational framework allowing to investigate the economic consequences of energy shocks and
stabilization policies in different simulation scenarios. These considerations explain the growing
interest in agent-based computational modelling as analytical tool to address energy topics (Hansen
et al., 2019). By allowing for agent heterogeneity and decentralized interactions, agent-based models
(ABM) bring new insights into the energy shock literature that the standard methodologies could
be missing (Lengnick, 2013). For instance, the granularity and flexibility of agent-based framework
allows to design highly detailed stabilization policies in response to energy shocks, taking also into
account potential distributional effects on households and firms.
Policy analyses have been extensively explored in the macroeconomic ABM literature (Fagiolo
and Roventini, 2012; Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018), focusing on different policy areas such as fiscal
(Dosi et al., 2013; Teglio et al., 2019), monetary (Delli Gatti and Desiderio, 2015; Giri et al., 2019),
labor market (Dosi et al., 2018), macro-prudential (Aldasoro et al., 2017; Popoyan et al., 2017) and
regional policies (Dawid et al., 2018) as well as virus containment interventions and vaccination
strategies (Basurto et al., 2021; Delli Gatti et al., 2021). More recently, the potential of agent-based
modelling for performing economic and policy analyses related to climate and energy issues has been
increasingly recognized (Balint et al., 2017; Hansen et al., 2019; Castro et al., 2020). Works in this
field have mainly focused on the economic impacts of climate shocks (Lamperti et al., 2018), the
likelihood of energy transition and related economic risks (Hötte, 2020; Lamperti et al., 2020), the
role of green fiscal, monetary and financial policies in the shift towards low-carbon economy (Ponta
et al., 2018; Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018; Lamperti et al., 2021). Nonetheless, the questions
concerning energy shocks and related stabilization policies have remained widely overlooked within
6
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the macroeconomic ABM literature. The only example is van der Hoog and Deissenberg (2011).
Building on the EURACE@Unibi model (Deissenberg et al., 2008), this work investigates the
economic effects of energy price shocks and the role of two automatic stabilizers in mitigating the
negative effects, that is a consumer subsidy scheme and a tax reduction scheme. They find that
rising energy prices result in a considerable reduction in GDP and investment. Stabilization policies
help to accelerate the economic recovery, with tax reduction scheme yielding better outcomes both in
the short and in the long run due to the positive impact on innovative investment and productivity.
Instead, consumer subsidies have insignificant effects in short run and negatively affects the long-run
dynamics since the lower investments by firms result in a structural loss of GDP.
Yet, the model used by van der Hoog and Deissenberg (2011) does not feature an explicit energy
sector and, subsequently, the design of energy shocks is rather simplistic. The energy crisis is
conceived as an exogenous increase in the production costs of capital goods firms, which is then
transmitted to the final consumption good. Instead, our model is characterized by an endogenous
energy sectors which is related via interlocked input demand to consumption and capital industries.
This allows us to analyse the complex dynamics resulting from exogenous energy shocks hitting the
economy, taking into consideration possible market imbalances, supply bottlenecks and feedback
loops between the energy sector and the rest of the macroeconomy.

3.

An overview of the model

The model depicts an economy composed of heterogeneous households, firms and banks, an exogenous
fossil fuel sector, a central bank and a government. Households (h = 1, . . . , N H ) are divided between
workers (N W ), entrepreneurs (N F ) and bankers ( N B ). Firms (f = 1, . . . , N F ) fall into three different
sectors: energy services (E), consumption goods (C) and capital goods (K) sectors. The banking
sector consists of (b = 1, . . . , N B ) banks. Entrepreneurs and bankers own respectively one firm and
bank each.
Households have different income sources depending on their type and economic status. They
receive: a wage if they are an employed worker; a dividend if they are an entrepreneur or banker of
an active company; a public transfer if their income falls short of a certain threshold. Households
purchase a consumption good and accumulate savings in the form of bank deposits. In addition,
firm and bank owners recapitalize their own company in case of default.
Firms purchase the required inputs in the respective market before starting the production,
update their net worth based on profits or losses and, finally, adjust the desired price, quantity and
related input demand for the subsequent period. Since firms pay for production factors in advance,
if the expected cash outflow exceeds internal funds, they borrow from banks to cover the financing
gap.
Banks hold households and firms’ deposits, supply credit to firms in compliance with capital
requirements and buy public bonds.
The government collects taxes on household and firms’ income, distributes transfers to low-income
individuals and bails out failed banks. If public spending exceeds tax revenues, the government
finances the deficit by issuing new bonds, conditional on the fiscal space implied by the debt
sustainability rule. The central bank sets the risk-free policy rate following an inertial Taylor rule.
Since the main focus of this work is the analysis of the macro-stabilization policies in response to
energy shocks, in the next section we limit ourselves to briefly describe the overall macroeconomic
environment of the model, including the sequence of the events, the behavioural rules followed
by each agent group and the matching protocols governing the market transactions. For a more
detailed description of the model, the interested reader is referred to the aforementioned original
paper (Ciola et al., 2022b) or to the Appendix A of the present one.
7
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3.1. Sequence of the events
In each simulation time period (t), the sequence of events unfolds as follows:
1. Initialization. At the beginning of each time step, firms are equipped with the amount of
capital, debt and deposits inherited from the previous period. Further, they have already set
their desired level of production, selling prices, and inputs demand.2
2. Markets for production factors:
i. Labour market. Workers inelastically supply up to one unit of labour to hiring firms in
exchange of a wage, pay income taxes and update their consumption budget;
ii. Fossil fuel market. E-firms purchase the required energy input from the fossil fuel sector;
iii. Energy market. E-firms generate energy services using fossil fuel, labour and capital
stock and sell them to C- and K-firms.
iv. Goods market. C-firms combine capital stock, labour and energy services to produce the
consumption good and sell it to households;
v. Capital good market. K-firms supply capital goods to C- and E-firms using labour and
energy services. Capital goods are available from the subsequent period.
3. Profits, taxes and dividends. Once the respective market is closed, selling firms compute profits
and pay taxes to the government, a share of their outstanding debt to banks, and dividends to
the owners.
4. Firms default. If a firm is insolvent (negative net worth) or illiquid (negative liquidity), and
the owner does not have sufficient resources to cover the losses, it declares default and the
lending bank must account for non-performing loans. Subsequently, the owner initializes a
new enterprise by purchasing the assets of the defaulted firm using his private wealth and, if
not sufficient, a new bank credit.
5. Banks profits, NPL and default. Banks compute profits and pay taxes to the government
and dividends to the owners. If non-performing loans result in a bank default, the bank
compensates the losses by recurring to the banker’s private wealth. If not sufficient, the
government steps in to bail out the failed bank.
6. Planning price & quantity and input demand. Firms update their desired price-quantity
strategy for the subsequent period and calculate conditional input demands accordingly. If
the expected cost of inputs exceeds internal funds, firms resort to the credit market to cover
the financing gap.
7. The government updates its fiscal position and adjusts the tax rate and social transfers to
comply with a fiscal sustainability rule.
8. The central bank sets the policy rate following an inertial Taylor rule depending on the
deviation from target inflation and unemployment.
2 At the time t = 0, the system is initialized at the perfect competition steady state solution as shown in the
Appendix A.6.

8
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3.2. Households
Households h = 1, . . . , N W can be either workers, entrepreneurs or bankers.
of the households (Yh,t ) depends on their type:

Yh,t



Wt Nw,t
= DIVf ,t − RECf ,t


DIVb,t − RECb,t

3

The nominal income

for workers
for entrepreneurs

(1)

for bankers

Workers inelastically supply Nw,t ∈(0,1) units of labour in exchange of an uniform salary, Wt ,
evolving over time according to institutional factors.4 Entrepreneurs and bankers get dividends,
DIVh,t , if their company is economically active and sustain recapitalization costs, RECh,t , if their
company goes bankrupt. Moreover, low-income households receive a public transfer from the
government if their income falls short of a given threshold. The household’s consumption budget,
d , is defined as the weighted sum between permanent income, Ȳ ,5 and financial wealth (i.e.,
Hh,t
h,t
deposits):
d
Hh,t
= Ȳh,t + χDh,t ,
(2)
with χ being the propensity to consume out of financial wealth.

3.3. Firms
The corporate sector is composed of heterogeneous firms belonging to three different industries:
energy, consumption and capital good.6 Operating in a context of limited information and bounded
rationality, firms determine the desired level of price and quantity according to a learning mechanism
depending on evolving market conditions and strategic interaction. According to that, firms set the
desired combination of price and quantity by imitating the {P , Q} strategy of a target competitor7 ,
if more profitable, or by exploring a neighbour of their current strategy according to past excess
demand. Formally, after identifying the target competitor s, the firm f updates its desired quantity
and price for the subsequent period {Q∗f ,t+1 , Pf ,t+1 } as described below:
Q∗f ,t+1

=

Pf ,t+1 =

(
ζ Q Q∗f ,t + (1 − ζ Q )Qs,t
ζ Q Q∗f ,t

+ (1 − ζ Q )Q̂f ,t

(
ζ P Pf ,t + (1 − ζ P )Ps,t
ζ P Pf ,t + (1 − ζ P )P̂f ,t

if Πs,t ≥ Πf ,t
otherwise
if Πs,t ≥ Πf ,t
otherwise

(3)

(4)

where Ps,t , Qs,t and Πs,t are, respectively the price, quantity and profits of the target competitor s.
Equations (3) and (4) state that if the profits realized by the target firm s are higher than f ’s,
price and desired quantity are smoothly adjusted towards the target’s values, with ζ Q and ζ P being
the speeds of adjustment. Otherwise, the firm f explores a neighbourhood its current strategy,
3 See

Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the household sector.
Appendix A.2.
5 The permanent income is defined as a weighted average of current net income and past permanent income levels,
updated by expected inflation. The net income is the maximum between after-tax nominal income and social transfer
received.
6 See Appendix A.3 for a full description of the corporate sector.
7 The choice of the target competitor is determined through a logit model decreasing with the technological distance.
The latter is computed as the difference between firms’ relative positions in the size distribution in terms of nominal
4 See

production. In symbol, df ,s,t = ŷf ,t − ŷs,t , where ŷf ,t ≡

Pf ,t Qf ,t −min (Pf ,t Qf ,t )
.
max (Pf ,t Qf ,t )−min (Pf ,t Qf ,t )

In words, the probability for

firm f of observing the target competitor s is higher the lower their distance, df ,s,t .
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{Q̂f ,t , P̂f ,t } by drawing a random number from a uniform distribution, the sign of which being
positive (negative) in case of excess demand (supply). This means that the direction of price and
quantity adjustments is influenced by firm’s past economic performance.

n
Given the desired production (Q∗f ,t+1 ) and expected input prices Ef ,t [Pj,t+1 ] j =1 , each firm f


sets the conditional input demand that minimizes its expected direct costs Ef ,t DCf ,t+1 subject
to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production technology and irreversible investments,
that is:
min

{Xf ,j,t+1 ;∆Xf ,j,t+1 }n
j =1

n

 X
Ef ,t DCf ,t+1 =
Ef ,t [Pj,t+1 ] ∆Xj,f ,t+1

(5)

j =1

s.t. Q∗f ,t+1


1
ρ
n
X
ρ f f


=
Aj,f ,t+1 Xj,f ,t+1

(6)

j =1

Xj,f ,t+1 = ∆Xj,f ,t+1 + (1 − δj )Xj,f ,t

(7)

∆Xj,f ,t+1 ≥ 0 when j indicates physical capital,

(8)

where ∆Xj,f ,t+1 , δj and Aj,f ,t+1 are the additional input demand, the depreciation rate and the factor
share of input j, while ρf is the substitution parameter between inputs. Clearly, the composition
of the production function varies depending on the industry: the energy sector requires capital,
labour and an energy fossil fuel input;8 the capital good sector uses energy services and labour;
the consumption good sector employs energy services, labour and capital. By solving the cost
minimization problem, the nominal demand for additional input reads:



Aj,f ,t+1 ψf ,t+1 σf ∗
d
Hj,f
=
E
P
Q
−
(
1
−
δ
)
X
∀j = 1, . . . , n
(9)
[
]
j,t+1
j
f ,t
j,f ,t
,t+1
f ,t+1
Ef ,t [Pj,t+1 ]
where
ψf ,t+1


 1
1−σf
n
X
1−σf
σ f
=
Ef ,t [Pj,t+1 ]
Aj,f ,t+1 

(10)

j =1

are the expected marginal costs.
Since firms must pay for production factors in advance, if the expected direct costs are higher
than internal liquidity, they seek to obtain external funds by borrowing in a decentralized credit
market. If the liquid resources are still insufficient due to credit rationing, firms will determine the
optimal input demand that maximizes the attainable production given the liquidity constraints.

3.4. Banking sector
The banking sector provides credit to borrowing firms that need external finance to purchase
production inputs. The price of loan depends upon the financial situation of the borrower-lender,
while its quantity is determined by capital requirements.9 In particular, the interest rate on loans
charged by bank b to the borrowing firm f at the time t is given by:


L
N
W
f ,t
b,t
 + ιB N P Lt−1 ,
ib,f ,t = iCB
+ ρB
+ ϱB 1 −
(11)
t
N Wf ,t
max N Ws,t
Lt−1
s=1,...,N B

8 See
9A

the description of the stylized fossil fuel sector in Appendix A.4.
detailed description of the banking sector can be found in Appendix A.5.

10
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where ρB , ϱB , ιB > 0 are interest rate-related parameters. According to (11), the cost of external
finance is increasing with the risk-free policy rate iCB
t , the firm’s leverage ratio, Lf ,t /N Wf ,t , and
the non-performing loans ratio, N P Lt−1 /Lt−1 , while decreasing with the bank’s net worth, N Wb,t .
In line with the Basel III international regulatory framework, banks must comply with macroprudential capital requirements which define both (i) the total amount of credit that they can extend
and (ii) the maximum exposure to a single counterpart. This implies that borrowing firms might be
unable to fully satisfy their financing needs, in which case they are forced to scale down the desired
production and, subsequently, the input demand.

3.5. Central bank
The central bank sets the risk-free policy rate, iCB
t , following an inertial Taylor rule, that is:
CB
iCB
= ρCB iCB
) max [0, r∗ + p∗ + λy (u∗ − ut−1 ) + λp (pC,t−1 − p∗ )] .
t
t−1 + (1 − ρ

(12)

According to equation (12), the central bank reacts to deviations in inflation and unemployment
rates from their target levels, respectively p∗ and u∗ , given the steady-state interest rate r∗ . To
avoid abrupt changes in firms’ financing conditions, the interest rate is slowly adjusted to the level
implied by the Taylor rule, with ρCB defining the speed of adjustment (Castelnuovo, 2003).

3.6. Government
The government collects taxes (T AXt ) from agents’ income (i.e., workers’ wages and firms and
banks’ profits), distributes transfers (T RAt ) to low-income households, and acts as a lender of last
resort providing liquidity (EXPt ) to failed banks. If public spending exceeds tax revenues, the
government issues additional bonds which are bought by the banking sector. The interest rate paid
on public bonds to banks is the risk-free policy rate set by the central bank (iCB
t ). Hence, public
debt (Bt ) evolves according to the following law of motion:
Bt = (1 + iCB
t−1 )Bt−1 + T RAt + EXPt − T AXt .

(13)

The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio can be written as:
bt + 1 =

1 + iCB
t
bt − ft+1 ,
1 + gt

(14)

where bt is debt-to-GDP ratio, ft ≡ (T AXt − T RAt − EXPt )/GDPt is the primary budget-to-GDP,
and gt is the expected nominal growth rate of GDP. The government must comply with a fiscal
sustainability rule that prevents public debt from increasing indefinitely.10 According to that, the
government smoothly adjusts the current debt-to-GPD ratio to a target value b∗ at a rate ρG as
follows:
bt+1 = bt + ρG (b∗ − bt ).
(15)
By substituting (15) into (14), we obtain the expected primary balance (or planned budget) for the
subsequent period, that is:

−ft+1 = ρG b∗ + (1 − ρG ) 1 −
10 See,


1 + iCB
t
bt ,.
(1 + gt )(1 − ρG )

(16)

for example, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for the European Union member states.
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To comply with the expected primary balance resulting from the fiscal rule, the government
modifies the level of tax rate, τttax , while leaving unchanged the share of social transfer over GDP,
τttra , at a rate ψ G . The latter can be increased only if the expected primary balance guarantees
enough fiscal space, that is:


τttra = max ψ G , −ft+1 ,
(17)
where τttra represents the share of social expenditures and ψ G is the constant benchmark value.11
Given τttra , the tax rate for the current period is thus defined as:

τttax = max 0, ft+1 + τttra .
(18)
If negative, the tax rate is set equal to zero, as consumer and firm subsidies are formalized in a
different manner (see next section).

4.

Energy shocks and policy scenarios

Following the observed increase in the price of natural gas in Europe (+300% annual growth between
May 2021 and 2022, source: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System), we characterize the energy
price shock as a 300% increase in the price of fossil fuel, followed by an autoregressive process with
ρs = 0.8. Moreover, we calibrate those parameters such that the simulated real GDP loss (including
the effect of stabilization policies) one and two years after the shock is in line with the IMF’s and
the European Commission’s downward revision of 2022-2023 growth forecasts (see Table 2).
Table 2: Revision of expected GDP in the Euro Area: actual vs simulated data.

Year
AMECO
IMF
MATRIX

no policy
policy 1
policy 2

2022

2023

−1.21%
−1.22%

−1.32%
−0.90%

−5.80%
−1.21%
−3.50%

−1.21%
1.42%
−0.56%

Note: percentage deviation of expected aggregate production in the Euro Area between autumn 2021 and spring 2022
forecasts. Comparison with simulated data in selected policy scenarios, i.e., no policy, SF (policy 1) and medium ET
(policy 2), see Table 3). Source: annual macro-economic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General
for Economic and Financial Affairs (AMECO), autumn 2021 and spring 2022 vintages; International Monetary Fund,
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2021 and April 2022 vintages.

Table 3 summarizes the set of policy experiments that we implement in our analysis together
with a brief description. They consist of five different macro-stabilization policies, that is tax cuts
(TC), household subsidy (SH), firm subsidy (SF), extra-profit tax (XT) and energy tariff reduction
(ET).
The simulation protocol is defined as follows. First, we construct the baseline scenario (without
shock) calibrated on Euro Area data.12 Then, we simulate the shock scenario, i.e., the baseline
scenario + energy price shock, and, on top of that, the five policy scenarios illustrated in Table
3. For each scenario, we run 250 Monte Carlo replicas of the model with different random seeds
11 This reflects the stable ratio of social expenditures net of pension spending to GDP observed in countries such as
the EA.
12 The validation procedure is presented in Appendix B.
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Table 3: Policy experiments.

Label

Macro-stabilization policy

Description

TC
SH
SF
XT
ET

Tax cuts
Households subsidy
Firms subsidy
Extra-profits tax
Energy tariffs reduction

Reduction in tax rate proportional to % change in GDP
Transfers to households proportional to loss of income
Transfers to firms proportional to loss of profits
Taxation of extra-profits in energy sector
Reduced charges on fossil input price

and compute the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) to compare the model outcomes under shock
and policy scenarios with the baseline. In particular, we compute the percentage deviation from
the baseline for the variables expressed in in levels (e.g., GDP, final good price), while the absolute
deviation for the variables defined in percentage terms (e.g., public debt to GDP ratio, unemployment
rate).

4.1. Tax cuts & subsidies
We start by analysing the first three policy scenarios, namely tax cuts, household and firm subsidy
schemes. Since the aim of these policies is to compensate for agents’ loss of income due to energy
shocks, they are introduced in Tshock + 1, that is, after the loss was realized.
More specifically, tax cuts apply to all agents in the model, both households and firms, and consist
of a percentage reduction in income tax rate proportional to the aggregate GDP loss, computed as
the relative deviation of current GDP from its historical level. Household/firm subsidies consist
of a transfer to households/firms proportional to their individual income losses, computed as the
absolute deviation of current income/profits from their historical level. In symbols:


∆τt = min 0, ψtF P GDPt /GDP − 1 ,
(19)



Sh,t = min 0, ψtF P Yh,t − Y h ,
(20)



Sf ,t = min 0, ψtF P Πf ,t − Πf ,
(21)
where GDP , Y h and Πh are the real medians of aggregate GDP, household h’s income and firms f ’
profits over the last 20 simulation steps (i.e., 5 years) before the shock, then adjusted for current
prices. The intensity of fiscal policy is governed by the time-varying parameter ψtF P , which is set
equal to one in Tshock + 1 and then gradually declines following the AR process of the shock.13
This means that the government is willing to fully compensate for the income losses accruing in the
first quarter of the shock. Afterwards, the policy strength reflects the severity of the energy crisis,
captured by the size of the shock, which is assumed to slowly diminish over time.14 Note that by
equations (19)-(21) the level of tax cuts and subsidies is endogenously determined by the extent of
the aggregate/individual income loss, with a compensation rate diminishing over time. Therefore,
13 In our view, this is the most efficient way to formalize the intensity and duration of policy intervention without
introducing ad-hoc assumptions on government behaviour and adding further parameters.
14 In all policy scenarios, to provide the government with enough resources without jeopardizing the stability of
the economy and the sustainability of its financial position, the speed of adjustment toward the target debt-GDP
ratio, ρG , is initially set to zero and then gradually converges to the baseline value following the policy intensity,
ψtF P . In this way, both the strength of stabilization policies and the tightness of budget constraints are governed by
the parameter ψtF P , which in turn depends on the evolution of the shock.
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concerning the subsidy policy, firms and households that experience greater losses will receive more
financial support from the government.

Figure 1: Macroeconomic effects of energy price shock and policy responses.
Note: IRFs of the simulated economy to a 300% increase in fossil fuel price. Scenarios: no policy (black); tax cuts
(blue); household subsidy (green); firm subsidy (red). Averages (solid lines) and 90% confidence intervals (dotted
lines) computed on 250 independent replicas.

Figure 1 compares the economic impacts of tax cuts and household and firm subsidies with the
no policy scenario relative to the baseline (without shock). The time unit is a quarter, where quarter
zero is the time when the shock hit the economy. We start by assessing the macroeconomic effects
of energy price shock in the absence of stabilization policies from the no-policy context (black line)
in Figure 1. An exogenous increase in fossil fuel price leads to a spike in inflation rate driven by
rising energy prices, which remain above the pre-shock levels. The economy experiences a severe
contraction characterized by lower output and employment, followed by a slow recovery. The real
GDP declines by nearly -10% in the first quarter and, in the absence of stabilization policies, it
takes approximately 12 quarters (i.e., 3 years) to recover to its pre-shock levels. More in detail,
the recession originates in the energy sector and then propagates to the rest of the economy via
decentralized market interactions. Indeed, given their predefined input budget, E-firms fail to fulfil
their fossil fuel demand because of the unexpected price shock, resulting in lower supply and higher
price of energy. As a result, the energy shortage induces consumption and capital goods firms to cut
back their economic activity and lay off workers. At the same time, the increased production costs
due to higher energy prices exacerbate the financial situation of the corporate sector, leading to
higher default rates (+5%) due to firms’ inability to meet financial obligations. After the initial
14
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downturn, the economic system gradually converges to its pre-shock level despite the persistent
increase in energy prices. That is due to a substitution effect by which firms are encouraged to
replace energy inputs with other relatively cheaper factors of production, such as labour and capital.
As we exclude ad-hoc changes in the conduct of monetary policy in the present analysis, the central
bank reacts to the energy price shock by increasing the policy rate to contain price inflation.15

Figure 2: Sectoral effects of energy price shock and policy responses.
Note: IRFs of the simulated economy to a 300% increase in fossil fuel price. Scenarios: no policy (black); firm subsidy
(red). Averages (solid lines) and 90% confidence intervals (dotted lines) computed on 250 independent replicas.

Moving to stabilization policies, tax cuts (blue) and consumer subsidy (green) do not have a
significant impact on economic activity, as the respective curves mostly overlap with the no-policy
scenario (black) for the entire period under consideration (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, the consumer
subsidy scheme comes with a very high price in terms of soaring public deficit, as shown in the
bottom-left pane of Figure 1. The reason is that while this policy involves a significant disbursement
of public funds because it targets the whole population of households, its marginal impact on
individual consumer spending is relatively small. Indeed, by assumption, energy services are not
part of the consumption budget, and therefore households face only the indirect costs of energy
shocks via lower real and nominal wages. On the contrary, firm subsidy (red) seems to be the most
effective policy in mitigating the adverse effects of energy price increases in the short run. In fact,
15We tried alternative monetary policy rules by varying the inertia of the Taylor rule, ρCB , and the weight given to
inflation, λp , finding that short-term effects of stabilization policies are essentially similar. Results are available upon
request.
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by limiting the number of defaults, subsidies paid to firms can shorten the time to recovery and
contain the unemployment rate at relatively low public costs. However, under this policy scenario,
the economy experiences a second downturn in the medium run, about ten quarters after the initial
shock. Indeed, by keeping artificially alive firms that would have defaulted even in the absence
of the shock – as manifested by the negative difference in the default rate relative to the baseline
–, firm subsidy leads the economy to overheat, fostering a credit-driven expansion that eventually
enhances the financial fragility of the system.
To better understand the mechanism behind this second downturn, Figure 2 shows the economic
effects of the energy price shock by sector. In particular, economic losses associated with the
second downturn are concentrated in the consumption goods sector. Indeed, upstream (energy
and capital goods) firms manage to pass on the increase in production costs (spurred by the sharp
recovery) to customers, while downstream (consumption) firms fail to do so as they face tighter
demand conditions. It follows that C-firms seek to recover the liquidity shortage deriving from
falling profits by resorting to debt financing, thus becoming more exposed to the risk of bankruptcy,
which eventually materializes almost two years after the shock. In short, we find that firm subsidy
is highly effective at promoting a faster recovery by reducing corporate defaults but comes at the
cost of greater financial instability in the medium run due to market distortions created by the
subsidies.16

4.2. Extra-profit tax
Figure 1 and 2 show that an exogenous increase in the fossil fuel price leads to a persistent rise in
energy prices, resulting in greater profits for energy firms. A similar trend manifested in Europe
in the first half of 2022, where firms operating in the energy sector have seen their profits surge
extraordinarily because of the abnormal rise in energy prices. As reported in Table 1, that induced
several European countries, such as Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, to
introduce an extra-profit tax to redistribute windfall gains resulting from the energy price hike in
favour of the most vulnerable.
We design an excess profit tax resembling the policy introduced by the Italian government
in March 2022, Decree-Law No. 67/2022. Since the declared objective of the tax was to collect
resources to finance measures in support of households and businesses hit by the shock, we investigate
the impact of an extra-profit tax (XT) coupled with firm subsidy, which proved to be the policy
delivering the most significant results. Following the Italian government’s proposal, the extra-profit
tax applies to those firms that experience a positive change in profits above a specific threshold,
defined both in level and percentage terms, namely:
(

ψtXT ∆Πf ,t − Π if ∆Πf ,t > Π & ∆% Πf ,t > Π%
XTf ,t =
,
(22)
0
otherwise
where ∆Πf ,t = Πf ,t − Πf and ∆% Πf ,t = Πf ,t /Πf − 1 are, respectively, the absolute and percentage
deviations from the real median profit, Πf , over the last 20 simulation steps (i.e., 5 years) before
the shock, then adjusted for current prices; Π and Π% are the minimum thresholds that define the
extent of excess profits, respectively, in level and percentage terms. Specifically, equation (22) states
that if a firm f meets both conditions on the right-hand side, it must pay a tax ψtXT on the portion
16 This interesting result relates to the ongoing debate on the risk of “zombification" of the economy due to the
unconditional financial support provided to firms by public authorities in response to the Covid-19 shock. See, for
instance, Guerini et al. (2022) for the French case and Laeven et al. (2020) for Europe. Banerjee and Hofmann (2018)
document the rise of zombie firms in the pre-pandemic era.
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of profit variation that exceeds what is deemed to be a normal change.17 Introduced in Tshock + 1
like the FS, the tax is kept at the initial level for nXT periods and then gradually declines following
the AR process of the shock. We simulate three scenarios considering different initial levels of the tax
rate, i.e., ψ0XT = {0.1, 0.5, 1}, corresponding to a low, medium and high extra-profit tax scenario.
Figure 3 compares the effects of the introduction of an extra-profit tax at different rates coupled
with firm subsidy with the no-policy (black) and subsidy only (red) scenarios. As before, the plots
report for each scenario the cross-sectional means and bootstrap confidence intervals of the percentage
change of key macroeconomic variables from the baseline without shock. The introduction of an
extra-profit tax does not have a significant impact on real GDP but, if not too low, alleviates the
economic and financial costs of firm subsidy by substantially reducing the level of public debt-to-GDP
ratio. In particular, the higher the initial tax rate, the lower the public debt. Consequently, because
the enhanced flow of tax revenues helps to ease budgetary constraints, the government can reduce
the income tax rate (bottom-right pane), although this has a negligible economic impact in our
model.

Figure 3: Macroeconomic effects of energy price shock and extra-profit tax.
Note: IRFs of the simulated economy to a 300% increase in fossil fuel price. Scenarios: no policy (black); SF only
(red); low XT+SF (orange); medium XT+SF (light blue); high XT+SF (purple). Averages (solid lines) and 90%
confidence intervals (dotted lines) computed on 250 independent replicas.

Moreover, the top-right pane in Figure 3 shows that, as expected, the introduction of a windfall
17 The Italian government set Π% equal to 10% and Π equal to €5 mln, which, based on our calculation using
Italian energy firm-level data from Compustat, corresponds to roughly 7.75% of the mean of the pre-shock energy
firms’ profit distribution.
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tax determines a significant reduction in energy firms’ profits, even if they remain higher than they
would have been in the absence of the energy shock. Nevertheless, for a high value of XT, the energy
profits dynamics exhibit large fluctuations, which are then reflected in the flow of tax revenues.
That happens because, when the windfall tax is too high, the government systematically fails to
define the correct measure of extra-profits, oscillating between excessive taxation and the provision
of financial support to energy firms from one period to another. Even though such an unstable
pattern does not have severe repercussions on the model dynamics because of the simplified version
of the energy sector, it is reasonable to think that, in reality, that would cause severe problems for
the functioning of the energy market and, subsequently, for the economy as a whole. Therefore, our
findings suggest that, if too low, the extra-profit tax would be essentially ineffective in stabilizing
public finances. At the same time, if too high, it might risk compromising the financial viability of
the energy sector, with likely negative effects on the macroeconomy.

4.3. Energy tariff reduction
Table 1 show that most of the European countries introduced forms of energy tax reductions to
contain energy price increases and mitigate the adverse consequences on consumers and businesses.
In light of this, in this policy scenario, we investigate the effects of a reduced excise tax on fossil fuel
prices, with the government paying the difference between the purchase price for consumers (energy
firms) and the selling price set by the producers (fossil fuel sector). In formula:


prod
cons
PO,t
= 1 + τt − ψtET · PO,t
,
(23)
cons and P prod are the fossil fuel price, respectively, paid by the consumers and charged
where PO,t
O,t
by the producer, τt is the excise tax on fossil fuel and ψtET is the extent of energy tax reduction
defined by the government.
Contrary to the subsidy which is meant to compensate for income losses once they have occurred,
the energy tariff reduction can be effectively implemented in Tshock to halt the spike in energy
prices. Once introduced, we assume that the tax relief, ψtET , remains in place at the initial level
for nET periods and then gradually declines following the AR process of the shock. As with the
extra-profit tax, we simulate three scenarios with different levels of energy tariff reductions, i.e.,
ψ0ET = {0.05, 0.15, 0.50}.
Figure 4 shows the macroeconomic effects of different levels of energy tariff reduction in comparison
with the no-policy scenario. If introduced in a timely fashion and at an appropriate level, the energy
tax reduction can strongly mitigate the adverse effects of the energy shock without creating the
market distortions brought about by firm subsidies. By containing the spike in energy prices, this
policy allows tackling the root causes of the crisis, leading to higher real wages and lower firms’
defaults, with positive effects on consumer spending, GDP and employment. In terms of public
finances, the higher the tariff reduction, the higher the public deficit to GDP. Nevertheless, the
amount of resources needed to fund a 50% tariff reduction (high ET scenario) is approximately one
order of magnitude lower than the firm subsidy.

4.4. Overall policy comparison
Figure 5 presents an overall comparison of the stabilization policies in terms of time for the GDP to
complete recovery (in quarters) and related change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition
to the individual experiments discussed above, we also consider two scenarios characterized by a
combination of policy measures: policy mix 1 combines energy tariff reduction and extra-profit
18
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic effects of energy price shock and energy tariff reduction.
Note: IRFs of the simulated economy to a 300% increase in fossil fuel price. Scenarios: no policy (black); low ET
(yellow); medium ET (light blue); high ET (purple). Averages (solid lines) and 90% confidence intervals (dotted lines)
computed on 250 independent replicas.

tax (EXT); on top of that, policy mix 2 includes also firm subsidy (EXT + SF). Notice that firm
subsidy is undoubtedly the most effective policy to promote a faster recovery, almost halving the
time required to reach the pre-shock GDP level, especially if combined with ET and XT, as in the
policy mix 2 scenario. Also, energy tariff reduction, alone and in combination with an extra-profit
tax (policy mix 1), allows to speed up recovery at even lower public costs. However, the boxplots
for these policy scenarios exhibit larger volatility across simulations, suggesting that the ability of
ET to prompt a rapid recovery is more uncertain compared to the firm subsidy.
The plots in Figure 5 provide a synthetic overview of the short-run effects of the stabilization
policies. To evaluate their economic impacts on a longer time horizon, we compute a measure of
social welfare, defined as the sum of (log) individual real consumption expenditure by households.
Figure 6 shows for each policy experiment the change in social welfare relative to the no-policy
scenario, both over time (left pane) and the discounted value at Tshock (right pane). We can see
that social welfare is maximized under the ET scenarios, while it is somewhat lower in the presence
of firm subsidy. That is because, whereas both these policies entail welfare-enhancing effects in the
short run, the second downturn resulting from the market distortions created by the subsidy brings
down household welfare in the medium term.
Consumer subsidy is clearly an inferior policy option in our model also in terms of social welfare.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, this policy entails a significant disbursement of public resources with
19
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no significant impact on aggregate economic activity. The resulting increase in the public debt to
GDP ratio induces the government to face tighter budgetary constraints and raise the tax rate,
which eventually undermines household income and consumption expenditure.
% change in debt/GDP

Time to recovery
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Figure 5: Time to recovery and change in public debt-to-GDP.
Note: box plots of the time to recovery (left pane) and the change in public debt-to-GDP (right pane) in the simulated
economy after a 300% increase in fossil fuel price. Scenarios: no policy (black); tax cuts (TC, blue); household subsidy
(SH, green); firm subsidy (SF, red); extra-profit tax (medium-XT, light blue); energy tariff reduction (high-ET,
purple); policy mix 1 (ET+XT, yellow); policy mix 2 (ET+XT+SF, green). Results computed on 250 independent
replicas.
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Figure 6: Social welfare and policy scenarios.
Note: instantaneous (left pane) and discounted (right pane) variation of aggregate social welfare between no policy
scenario and policy interventions. Scenarios: tax cuts (TC, blue); household subsidy (SH, green); firm subsidy (SF,
red); extra-profit tax (medium-XT, light blue); energy tariff reduction (high-ET, purple); policy mix 1 (ET+XT,
yellow); policy mix 2 (ET+XT+SF, green). Results computed on 250 independent replicas.

4.5. Distributional impacts of energy price shock and stabilization policies
So far, we have examined the economic effects of different types of macro-stabilization policies
in response to energy price increases at the aggregate and sectoral levels. Departing from the
representative agent hypothesis of the standard approach, a key feature of ABMs lies in the
20
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heterogeneity of agents’ characteristics and behavioural rules, which allows addressing several issues
related to income inequality and market structure (Caiani et al., 2019; Terranova and Turco, 2022).
In this section, we exploit this feature of the model to investigate how the energy price shock and
related stabilization policies impact the wealth distribution of heterogeneous agents.
Figure 7 compares the distributions of individual wealth changes one year after the shock for
workers (left panes) and energy firms owners (right panes) under the scenarios of no policy, tax
cuts (TC), household subsidy (SH) and firm subsidy (FS) relative to the baseline. To highlight
the specific contribution of each policy, the bottom panes display the difference in the probability
distribution of the three policy scenarios from the no-policy one. On average and independently of
the stabilization policy, the energy price shock entails opposite effects on agents’ wealth, negative for
workers and positive for energy entrepreneurs. Indeed, nominal and real wages slow down because of
the spike in unemployment and inflation rates caused by the shock. At the same time, the increase
in energy prices boost energy firms’ profits, resulting in higher dividend payments and thus financial
wealth for energy entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the left skewness of the wealth distribution under the
no-policy scenario indicates that not all energy firm owners benefit from the shock: a consistent
share of individuals sees no changes in wealth compared to the baseline, suggesting that the economic
gains are not equally distributed among energy firms. This effect disappears under the FS scenario
(red), where the distribution of energy entrepreneurs’ wealth changes becomes more symmetrical.
Indeed, by limiting the number of bankruptcies, subsidies paid to firms help stabilize corporate
profits, with positive effects for the energy sector both directly and through the improvement of
the financial situation in other industries. Also, tax cuts slightly improve the wealth of energy firm
owners, especially for the benefit of those who would experience minor positive changes in wealth
without policy. Interestingly, only household subsidy has a positive impact on workers’ wealth
distribution, albeit irrelevant from a macroeconomic perspective as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 7: Distributional effects of energy price shock and stabilization policies.
Note: distributional effects of the energy shock on workers (left panes) and energy entrepreneurs (right panes).
Probability density functions (upper panes) and deviations from the baseline (no shock) scenario (lower panes) of
income variation one year after the shock. Scenarios: no policy (black); tax cuts (blue); household subsidy (green);
firm subsidy (red). Results computed on 250 independent replicas.

Figure 8 shows the distributive effects of a windfall profits tax on energy firms for workers and
energy entrepreneurs one year after the shock. Unsurprisingly, the introduction of an extra-profit
21
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tax, by narrowing the net profits of the energy sector, leads to a lower increase in the wealth of
energy entrepreneurs, following the extra tax rate, with no sensible effects on workers’ wealth. A
similar result is obtained under the ET scenario as shown in Figure 9. In addition, by containing
the energy price increase and limiting its adverse effects on the economy (see 4), a reduced excise
tax on fossil fuel prices leads to a sizeable improvement in workers’ wealth, especially for a high
value of tariff cuts. Hence, energy tax reduction seems to be the most effective policy to mitigate
the economic impact of an energy price increase and reduce the ensuing rise in income inequality.

Figure 8: Distributional effects of energy price shock and extra-profit tax.
Note: distributional effects of the energy shock on workers (left panes) and energy entrepreneurs (right panes).
Probability density functions (upper panes) and deviations from the baseline (no shock) scenario (lower panes) of
income variation one year after the shock. Scenarios: FS (red); low XT+FS (yellow); medium XT+FS (light blue);
high XT+FS (purple). Results computed on 250 independent replicas.

To conclude, Figure 10 shows for each policy scenario the percentage change in wealth by agent
group relative to the baseline at two points in time, that is, one year (top pane) and three years
(bottom pane) after the shock.18 Energy entrepreneurs benefit from an energy price shock in all
policy scenarios. That is especially true in the presence of tax cuts and subsidies, where their
financial wealth nearly doubles three years after the shock as a consequence of soaring energy profits.
By keeping energy prices under control, a fossil fuel tax reduction promotes the redistribution
of wealth from energy entrepreneurs to workers, especially if coupled with an extra-profit tax.
Interestingly, bankers benefit from the credit-driven recovery spurred by firm subsidies, at the
expense of downstream firm owners who experience significant wealth losses three years after the
shock since they have to pay the cost of the second downturn fuelled by market distortions.

18 The plots report the average value of percentage wealth change from the baseline without shock across 250 Monte
Carlo simulations.
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Figure 9: Distributional effects of energy price shock and energy tariff reduction.
Note: distributional effects of the energy shock on workers (left panes) and energy entrepreneurs (right panes).
Probability density functions (upper panes) and deviations from the baseline (no shock) scenario (lower panes) of
income variation one year after the shock. Scenarios: low ET (yellow); medium ET (light blue); high ET (purple).
Results computed on 250 independent replicas.
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Figure 10: Percentage change in wealth by agent group.
Note: average percentage change of wealth from the baseline (no policy) scenario under different policy interventions
by agent group one (upper pane) and three (lower panes) years after the energy shock. Results computed on 250
independent replicas.
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5.

Conclusion and Policy implication

This work introduces an energy price shock to the macroeconomic agent-based model MATRIX
(Multi-Agent model for Assessing Transition Risks) calibrated to depict the European Area at the
onset of the 2021–2022 energy crisis. The shock entails negative consequences for the simulated
economy, resulting in sharp consumer price inflation, a decrease in real GDP, increased firms’ defaults
and a higher unemployment rate. As a response, a battery of counteracting short-term policies
(i.e., non-structural or unrelated to a switch in energy production technologies) is tested. The
interventions under consideration, which are a stylized version of the majority of the policy answers
in Europe (Sgaravatti et al., 2021), are a general tax rate cut, households’ subsidies, firms’ subsidies,
an extra-profit tax for energy firms, an energy tariff reduction on the fossil fuel input, and two
different policy mixes (energy tariff reduction and extra profit tax in the first mix; adding firms
subsidies to the former in the second mix).
The agent-based features of the model allow us to evaluate different policy scenarios using
multiple evaluation criteria (time to recovery, change in public debt to GDP ratio, and social
welfare), as well as consider their distributional impact on the agents. According to our findings,
tax cuts and consumer subsidies are ineffective because the economy does not recover as quickly as
it would in the absence of those policies, while also increasing the national debt. On the contrary,
subsidies to firms provide a faster recovery but result in a second economic downturn in the medium
term due to the economy’s credit-driven expansion, which inflates and pops financially fragile firms.
An extra-profit (or windfall) tax on top of the firm’s subsidy maintains the same dynamic while
relieving the strain on public debt. The energy tariff reduction can dampen the negative impact of
the shock with no further downturn and at a lower cost to the public finances. In terms of time to
recovery, the subsidies to firms are the quickest, especially when combined with the energy tariff
reduction and the extra profit tax. In turn, the reduction in energy tariffs and the two mixes provide
superior equilibria in terms of social welfare. Indeed, in the medium term, the firm’s subsidies
discount the effects of the second recession.
From the distributional point of view, the shock affects, on average, the workers negatively and
the entrepreneurs positively in the energy sector. However, economic gains are not distributed
equally among energy entrepreneurs, with the firm subsidy policy making the distribution more
symmetrical. As expected, the windfall profit tax reduces wealth for energy entrepreneurs; the
energy tariff also displays this effect but reduces income inequality for workers. Overall, energy
entrepreneurs stand to gain in all of the policy scenarios. Bankers also benefit most from the
expansion in credit in the firms’ subsidies scenario.
We can infer several policy implications from this analysis. First, subsidies to firms are the
quickest way to recover the economy, but the policymaker should consider their effects on firms’
financial fragility, as exemplified here by the second crisis in the medium term. The energy tariff
reduction emerged as the most effective answer; coupled with an extra profit tax it can also erode
the distributional inequality exacerbated by the price shock. As a result, the extra-profit tax is
a valuable instrument to be considered in tandem with other policies. However, it needs careful
formulation: a sensitivity analysis on the tax level shows that a level too low might not have any
effect on the economy, while a too high one makes it difficult for the government to correctly assess
the extra profits, bringing uncertainty on the financial viability of the energy services sector. While
tax cuts and household subsidies are ineffective in this analysis, we believe that further work should
be conducted before discarding these instruments, perhaps in settings that allow a more direct link
between the energy shock and the households’ budget.
The main limitation of this work is the lack of a link between energy and the consumer’s side,
as most of the worries about the energy crisis pertain to the direct effect of rising bills on the
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household’s budget. Moreover, most of the tested policies are stylized representations of the ones
adopted in Europe, which might also differ in some details from country to country. It would also
be interesting to characterize the policies as more agent-specific, for instance, by making the tax
cuts proportional to the agent’s wealth.
Future work plans to address these limitations and further expand the MATRIX model to include
a fully-fledged climate box and a more detailed energy sector. That would make it possible to
study the shocks and policy implications in the context of the energy transition. This is a topic
of paramount importance in the EA, considering that the rise in energy prices might affect the
transition to renewable energy, as well as revamp the use of carbon-intensive fuels such as coal (Ari
et al., 2022). Undoubtedly, further study of policy answers to contrast energy shocks and crises is
needed in the current situation of uncertainty and inflationary concerns.
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A.

Description of the model

A.1. Households
d , households visit a subset Z C of C-firms chosen
At each time t, given their consumption budget Hh,t
h,t
at random and purchase goods from the firms offering the largest amount, given the buyer’s budget
and the sellers’ prices and quantities (see Appendix A.3 for the mechanism used by firms to adjust
price and supply quantity). If the amount of goods sold by firms is lower than the consumption
budget, consumers accumulate involuntary savings.
The nominal income Yh,t of household h at the time t depends on her type (i.e., worker,
entrepreneur or banker):

Yh,t



Wt Nw,t
= DIVf ,t − RECf ,t


DIVb,t − RECb,t

for workers
for entrepreneurs ,

(24)

for bankers

where Wt is the wage rate, Nw,t the supply of labour of worker w, DIVf ,t and DIVb,t are the
dividends distributed by firms and banks, and RECf ,t and RECb,t are the recapitalization costs
borne by the f -th entrepreneur and the b-th banker.
Since the government collects taxes on private agents’ income and distributes social transfers
net of the h-th household is given by the
to poor households (see Section 3.6), the net income Yh,t
maximum between after-tax income and the social transfer received:


net
Yh,t
= max (1 − τttax )Yh,t , T RAh,t .
(25)
To determine their consumption demand, households adopt an adaptive learning rule to estimate
a measure of their permanent income Ȳh,t (Assenza et al. (2015)):
net
Ȳh,t = (1 − ξ )Yh,t
+ ξ (1 + Et [pC,t ]) Ȳh,t−1 ,

(26)

where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a memory parameter and Et [pC,t ] is the expected inflation rate on consumption
goods.19 According to (26), the permanent income is given by a weighted average of current and
past income levels, updated by expected inflation, with geometrically decaying weights.
Then, the consumption budget can be expressed as a linear combination between permanent
income and a fraction of accumulated deposits:
d
d
Hh,t
= Eh,t [PC,t ]Ch,t
= Ȳh,t + χDh,t ,

(27)

where χ ∈ (0, 1) is the marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth (Godley and Lavoie,
2006).20 The difference between income and actual consumption is involuntary saving which increases
the existing deposits:
net
Dh,t = Dh,t−1 + Yh,t
− Hh,t ,
(28)
d is the actual consumption resulting from the matching process in the
where 0 ≤ Hh,t ≤ Hh,t
consumption good market.
19 Prices are expected at this stage since consumers do not know the actual values they will find in the market.
Here we assume that households use the expected growth rate of consumption goods Et [pC,t ] (see Appendix A.3) to
predict current prices, namely: Eh,t [PC,t ] = (1 + Et [pC,t ])Eh,t [PC,t−1 ], where Eh,t [PC,t−1 ] is the price observed by
consumer h at the time t − 1.
20 The consumption budget thus defined can be seen as a reduced form solution of a utility maximization problem
with log-utility function, see Ciola et al. (2022b) for detailed proof.
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A.2. Labour Market
In the labour market, firms hire and fire workers at no cost given their labour demand, while workers
supply up to one unit of labour inelastically given the wage rate. Since job seekers have limited
information on market conditions because they can visit only a subset of firms, search frictions may
prevent the adjustment of labour to market equilibrium, causing unfulfilled demand and supply.
Therefore, when the labour market closes, the wage rate is adjusted through an insider-outsider
bargaining process (Dosi et al., 2010), which depends on prevailing labour market conditions and
inflation expectations.
More precisely, given the labour supply Nts (i.e., the total number of workers, Nts = N W ), the
P d
aggregate labour demand Ntd (i.e., the sum of firms’ optimal labour demands, Ntd =
Nf ,t ) and
the current amount of hours worked Ntemp , the wage rate for the following period Wt+1 is defined as:



 emp 
h
i
Nt
Ntd
Wt + Et panc
Wt+1 = (1 + wt+1 )Wt = ρW Wt + (1 − ρW ) θW N emp
+ (1 − θ W ) N
s
C,t+1 Wt ,
t

t

(29)

where ρW is a fraction of the new wage unaffected by current labour market conditions. The
remaining part (1 − ρW ) depends on the insider-outsider bargaining power θW as follows: the higher
the labour demand over current employment, the faster the wage growth (insiders’ objective); while
the higher the labour supply respect to current employment, the lower the wage growth, positively
affecting the employment rate (outsiders’ objective). According to (29), the nominal wages growth
rate accounts for inflation expectation Et [panc
C,t+1 ], which is anchored to the central bank inflation
target p∗ , namely:


W
W ∗
Et panc
(30)
C,t+1 = ι Et [pC,t ] + (1 − ι )p ,
where Et [pC,t ] is the expected inflation of C-goods for the current period (see Appendix A.3) and
ιW is a decaying weight (Yetman, 2017; Mehrotra and Yetman, 2018).

A.3. Firms
Price and quantity adjustment Since agents can only visit a subset of the market, firms do not
know their demand in advance. Therefore, each firm forms expectations about future demand based
on their past economic performance adaptively revising a {P , Q} strategy to achieve higher profits.
Under these conditions, there is no unique price-quantity {P , Q} combination that guarantees the
market equilibrium.
In line with the macro ABM literature,21 we assume that firms set the desired combination of
price and quantity by imitating the {P , Q} strategy of similar competitors, if more successful, or by
exploring a neighbour of their current strategy according to past excess demand.
Similarity is defined as the distance (ds,f ,t ) between firm f and all the other firms s ̸= f ∈ N F
belonging to the same sector F = {E, C, K}. Its value is measured as the difference between firms’
relative positions in the firm size distribution in terms of nominal production, namely:
df ,s,t = ŷf ,t − ŷs,t ,
where ŷf ,t ≡

(31)

Pf ,t Qf ,t −min (Pf ,t Qf ,t )
.
max (Pf ,t Qf ,t )−min (Pf ,t Qf ,t )

21 See, among others,(Delli Gatti et al., 2011; Assenza et al., 2015; Riccetti et al., 2014; Caiani et al., 2016; Ciola
et al., 2022a)
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The target competitor is obtained through a weighted sampling from the list of all firms but f ,
with probability weights given by:
Pr(s = S|f , t) =

exp(−ω · df ,S,t )
,
P
exp −ω · df ,s,t

(32)

s̸=f ∈N F

where ω > 0 represents the intensity of choice, i.e., how fast firms target the closest competitor in
the distribution. According to (32), the probability for firm f of observing the target competitor s is
decreasing with their distance df ,s,t . Once the target competitor S is identified, the firm f updates
its desired quantity and price for the subsequent period {Q∗f ,t+1 , Pf ,t+1 } as follows:
(
ζ Q Q∗f ,t + (1 − ζ Q )QS,t if ΠS,t ≥ Πf ,t
Q∗f ,t+1 =
,
(33)
ζ Q Q∗f ,t + (1 − ζ Q )Q̂f ,t otherwise
(
ζ P Pf ,t + (1 − ζ P )PS,t if ΠS,t ≥ Πf ,t
Pf ,t+1 =
,
(34)
ζ P Pf ,t + (1 − ζ P )P̂f ,t otherwise
with ζ Q and ζ P representing the adjustment speeds of quantity and price, Q̂f ,t = Q∗f ,t · [1 + U · ∆f ,t ]
and P̂f ,t = Pf ,t · [1 + U · ∆f ,t ] are a neighbourhood of current desired quantity and price, with U
being a random drawn from a uniform distribution and ∆f ,t = (Qdf ,t − Q∗f ,t )/Q∗f ,t the percentage
deviation of observed demand Qdf ,t from past desired production Q∗f ,t .
Following the evolutionary algorithm of price-quantity setting with strategic complementarities
described by (33) and (34), if the profits realized by the target firm S are higher than f ’s, the f -th
firm smoothly adjusts price and desired quantity towards the target’s values. Otherwise, the f -th
firm updates its strategy by exploring the neighbourhood of the current desired quantity and price.
Thus, the excess demand (∆f ,t ) affects both the direction and the magnitude of price and quantity
adjustments, as in Assenza et al. (2015) and Delli Gatti and Reissl (2022).22 In other words, firms
seek to maximize profits either by locally searching for the most successful competitors and, if more
profitable, mimicking their {P , Q} strategy, or by adjusting their current strategy according to past
excess demand.
Lastly, all prices are revised to account for future changes in sectoral marginal costs aiming
to maintain the firms’ mark-ups unchanged. In this way, firms strive to maintain their mark-ups
unchanged. It follows that the expected growth of nominal prices in sector F = {E, C, K} is:
Et [pF ,t+1 ] =

Et [ψF ,t+1 | wt+1 , pO,t+1 ] − ψF ,t
,
ψF ,t

(35)

where ψF ,t are the average marginal costs of sector F at the time t and Et [ψF ,t+1 | wt+1 , pO,t+1 ]
is their expected value in the subsequent period given the expected change in wages Et [wt+1 ] and
fossil fuel price Et [pO,t+1 ] (see Appendix A.2 and A.4).
Production technology We assume that firms use a CES technology (Arrow et al., 1961) with
constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal returns.23 The production function of a generic
22 To avoid abrupt changes in price and quantity due to unexpectedly large excess demand, we impose an upper
(lower) bound on upward (downward) adjustments so that the actual price and quantity update is given by ∆f ,t =
min(γ P Q , ∆f ,t ) in case of excess demand (∆f ,t > 0), or ∆f ,t = max(−γ P Q , ∆f ,t ) in case of excess supply (∆f ,t < 0).
23While the Leontief and the Cobb-Douglas production functions are a common standard in the ABM literature,
we adopt the CES production function because: (i) it reduces to the Leontief and the Cobb-Douglas cases under
specific assumptions (i.e., it reduces to a Cobb-Douglas for σf = 1, a Leontief function when σf = 0); (ii) it increases
the flexibility of the model and improves its empirical validation.
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firm f at the time t is defined as follows:

Qf ,t


1
ρ
n
X
ρ f f
= Zf ,t 
Aj,f Xj,f ,t  ,

(36)

j =1

where Xj,f ,t is the quantity of input j = 1, . . . , n in the firm f at the time t,
factor shares, ρf =

σf −1
σf

Pn

j =1 Aj,f

= 1 are the

is the substitution parameter, σf is the Hicks elasticity of substitution and

Zf ,t = 1 is total factor productivity.24
The specification of the production function and the related parameter values vary across sectors.
More precisely, E-firms require capital, labour and fossil fuel to generate energy services; K-firms
require labour and energy services to produce capital goods; C-firms require energy services, labour
and physical capital to produce final consumption goods.
Credit demand Firms have to pay for production factors in advance and finance the difference
between expected direct costs of production (defined as in (9)) and the total amount of available
liquid resources through external finance. Hence, the firm’s demand for credit (∆Ldf ,t+1 ) is given by:


∆Ldf ,t+1 = Ef ,t DCf ,t+1 − Df ,t ,
(37)
where Df ,t are deposits.
Firms try to secure bank credit in a decentralized market and repay the principal at a fixed
instalment rate θB . Accordingly, firms do not have to pay off all the outstanding debt before they
can access new credit lines and, if needed, they can keep refinancing loans at the current interest
rate every time. As a result, firms’ debt and deposits update according to the following laws of
motion:
Lf ,t+1 = ∆Lf ,t+1 + (1 − θB )Lf ,t ,

(38)

Df ,t = ∆Lf ,t+1 + Df ,t ,

(39)

where Lf ,t is total debt, and 0 ≤ ∆Lf ,t+1 ≤ ∆Ldf ,t+1 is the new credit line. If liquid resources are still


insufficient to purchase production inputs (i.e., Df ,t < Ef ,t DCf ,t+1 ), firms reduce proportionally
their nominal demands:
d
d
H̄j,f
,t+1 = υf ,t+1 Hj,f ,t+1 − (1 − υf ,t+1 )(1 − δj )Ef ,t [Pj,t+1 ] Xj,f ,t

with
υf ,t+1 =

Df ,t +

Pn

∀j = 1, . . . , n,

j =1 Ef ,t

[Pj,t+1 ] (1 − δj )Xj,f ,t
,
ψf ,t+1 Q∗f ,t+1

(40)

(41)

where υf ,t+1 is the ratio between the available liquid resources and the expected total costs.
Profits, net worth and bankruptcy Once the reference market closes, the firms compute profits
as revenues net of direct costs for employed inputs and debt service. The equations of profits and
net worth accumulation are defined as:


NB
X
tax 
Πnet
if ,b,t Lf ,b,t  ,
(42)
f ,t = (1 − τt ) Pf ,t Qf ,t − DCf ,t −
b=1

N Wf ,t =
24We

N Wf ,t−1 + Πnet
f ,t

− DIVf ,t ,

(43)

normalize total factor productivity equal to one for the sake of simplicity.
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with τttax being the tax rate on profits and DIVf ,t the fraction of equity paid by solvent firms to
their owners in the form of dividends, namely:
h

i
DIVf ,t = max 0, min µF N Wf ,t , Df ,t ,
(44)
where µF = 1 − β F is the payout ratio of firms.
A firm might default when it becomes either insolvent (i.e., the net worth turns negative,
N Wf ,t < 0) or illiquid (i.e., the deposits are negative, Df ,t < 0). If the firm is illiquid but the
owner has sufficient resources to cover the liquidity shortage (i.e., Dh,t > |Df ,t |), the entrepreneur
recapitalises the suffering firm. In the other cases, the firm is declared bankrupt and, to keep the
number of agents constant, is replaced by a new entrant as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Dosi
et al. (2013). The entrant’s initial conditions are set in the following way: (i) the residual deposits
of the bankrupt firm are used to partly repay the outstanding debt; (ii) the entrepreneur seeks to
buy out the assets of the old firm at their historical cost by using her personal wealth and, if not
sufficient, by asking for a new bank loan in the credit market; (iii) the lending bank records a loss
equal to the difference between the funds raised by the entrepreneur and the remaining value of the
debt. Thus, the balance sheet of the new firm will have: on the asset side, the purchase value of the
assets that the entrepreneur managed to buy out from the old firm and, on the liability side, the
value of the new loan (if present).

A.4. Fossil fuel sector
Energy firms purchase fossil fuel at a fixed relative price to wages from a stylized foreign fossil fuel
sector with no capacity constraints as in Ponta et al. (2018).25 In other words, the quantity of fossil
fuel is determined by the E-firms demand, while the price growth follows wage inflation adapting
to mutated economic conditions (i.e., pO,t+1 = wt+1 , see Appendix A.2). To close the model, the
returns from the fossil fuels sales, net of taxes, are redistributed partly to energy firms (η O ) in the
form of additional revenues and partly to households (1 − η O ) as supplementary income. That is to
take into account the fact that part of oil and gas production is carried out domestically by energy
firms through onshore or offshore activities (η O ), while the remaining share is imported from abroad
(1 − η O ). In this way, our model can account for fossil fuel production and consumption without
overly complicating the baseline framework.26

A.5. Banks
The banking system is populated by (N B ) heterogeneous banks. Banks supply credit to the corporate
sector and make profits by charging differentiated interest rates on loans, hold firms’ and households’
deposits and buy the T-bills issued by the government in proportion to their net worth. We assume
that, in each period, firms repay a fraction θB of the principal plus interests on outstanding loans.
Interest rate The interest rate charged by banks to borrowers is in line with the external finance
premium hypothesized by Bernanke et al. (1999) but adds some important features. The firm-specific
interest rate on loans is a mark-up on the risk-free interest rate and depends on the firms’ financial
25We set the initial price of the fossil fuel input such that the aggregate fossil fuel expenditure over GDP in the
model is the same as the average value observed in the EA between 2001 and 2019, namely 4% (source: authors’
calculation on Eurostat data).
26 As a future line of research, we plan to endogenize the fossil fuel production and enrich the energy sector with a
variety of energy plants and production technologies (e.g., green and brown), including a more realistic matching
protocol for the electricity markets.
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fragility, as in the financial accelerators developed by Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015), Assenza et al.
(2015) and Delli Gatti and Desiderio (2015). Moreover, the financial soundness of the bank plays a
role in the definition of its credit policy: a higher financial strength (i.e., higher equity ratio) allows
for setting more favourable terms for extending credit (Delli Gatti et al., 2010). The last component
of (11) links the cost of external finance to the financial soundness of the banking sector as a whole.
As the amount of non-performing loans increases, banks raise the cost of external finance, increasing
credit rationing.
Prudential regulation Following the Basel III international regulatory framework, each bank b is
subject to the compliance with macro-prudential requirements defining the maximum level of credit
max
supplied (Lmax
b,t ) and its maximum exposure to a single counterpart (Lb,f ,t ). These two regulatory
constraints are defined as follows:
N Wb,t 1
Lmax
,
(45)
b,t =
γ B ωB
B
Lmax
b,f ,t = κ N Wb,t ,

(46)

where N Wb,t represents the bank’s net worth, γ B ∈ (0, 1) is the minimum capital adequacy ratio,
ω B is the risk-weight on corporate loans27 and κB > 0.
Profits and bankruptcies The b-th bank’s net worth evolves as follows:
N Wb,t = N Wb,t−1 + (1 − τttax )Πb,t − DIVb,t ,

(47)

where τttax is the tax rate, Πb,t are bank profits and DIVb,t are dividends (see (51)). Profits are
defined as:
Nf
X
X
Πb,t =
ib,f ,t Lb,f ,t −
N P Lb,f ,t ,
(48)
f =1

f ∈DF

where the first term on the right hand side is the sum of returns from solvent borrowers, while the
second represents the total value of non-performing loans, with DF being the set of bankrupted
firms.
According to the regulatory framework, the equity of each bank (N Wb,t ) must cover at least a
fraction 1/γ B of its risk-weighted assets ω B Lb,t , namely:
N Wb,t ≥

ω B Lb,t
.
γB

(49)

If condition (49) is satisfied, the bank computes a precautionary capital buffer on total deposits to
face unexpected increases in future credit demand:
∆D
b,t =

ω B Db,t
− N Wb,t ,
γB

and pays the net worth in excess as dividends to the owner:


DIVb,t = max 0, −∆D
b,t .
27 The

(50)

(51)

underlying assumption is that the risk-weight on cash and government bonds is zero.
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Conversely, when a bank does not meet the regulatory condition (49), the recapitalization and
default procedure consists of the following steps. The bank b computes the minimum equity variation
which satisfies (45):
∆L
b,t =

ω B Lb,t
− N Wb,t .
γB

(52)

Then, if the required capital ∆L
b,t is less than the banker’s own financial wealth (i.e., deposits,
B
Db,t ), the banker recapitalize the defaulted bank and the banks’ net worth is updated as follows:
W
N Wb,t = N Wb,t + ∆N
b,t ,

(53)

h

i
W
B
D
L
∆N
.
b,t = min Db,t , max ∆b,t , ∆b,t

(54)

W
with ∆N
b,t selected from:

These resources reduce the banker’s own deposits and income accordingly:
B
B
W
Db,t
= Db,t
− ∆N
b,t ,

Yb,t =

W
Yb,t − ∆N
b,t .

(55)
(56)

B
If the banker does not have sufficient financial resources to recapitalize the bank (i.e., ∆L
b,t ≥ Db,t ),
the latter is declared bankrupt. In this case the bank losses are borne by the government which
provides public liquidity to recapitalize default bank28 restoring its full functionality, namely:

EXPt = EXPt + ∆G
b,t = EXPt +

ω B Db,t
B
− Db,t
− N Wb,t .
γB

(57)

where EXPt is the public liquidity provided to recapitalize default banks. The bank’s net worth as
well as the banker’s income and deposits are updated as follows:
B
N Wb,t = ∆G
b,t + N Wb,t + Db,t ,

(58)

B
Yb,t = Yb,t − Db,t
,
B
Db,t = 0.

(59)
(60)

Finally, a bank which has received public support will use future dividends (see (51)) to buy back
the additional shares issued for the bailout to the government (∆G
b,t ). Notice that the recapitalization
and default procedure does not affect depositors because banks participate in a Deposit Guarantee
Scheme (DGS) to protect households and firms from losses on deposits. Hence, the DGS acts as a
safety net to avoid bank runs following the illiquidity of financial institutions.29

A.6. Initialization
We initialize the system at the steady-state under the following assumptions:
28 Since we introduce the government after t = 500 periods, banks are bailed by the central bank through a variation
in the monetary base before that moment, namely: Mt = Mt−1 + ∆G
b,t if t < 500.
29 Deposits insurance is in force in Europe since the Directive 2014/49/EU.
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1. All markets clear:30
labour market:

NW

d
= N E ∆XN
,E

energy market:

N E QE

=

capital market:
fossil fuel market:

K

N QK

=

QO

=

d
N ∆XK,E
d
N E ∆XO,E
.
E

d
+ N C ∆XN
,C

d
+ N K ∆XN
,K ,

(62)

d
N C ∆XE,C

d
+ N K ∆XE,K
,

(63)

+ N

C

d
∆XK,C
,

(64)
(65)

2. All firms set their price to maximize profits and operate under perfect competition, namely:
Πf = 0.

(66)

3. Fossil fuel expenditure over total final consumption is equal to ν O = 0.023:
PO QO = ν O NC PC QC .

(67)

4. Firms’ deposits and loans are equal to total revenues:
Df = Lf = Pf Qf .

(68)

5. The initial wage is set W0 = 10 as a numerator.

30We

remove the equilibrium condition on the consumption market:
N E Π E + N C Π C + N K Π K + N W W + PO QO = N C PC QC ,

(61)

since it is redundant by Walras’s law.
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B.

Model calibration and validation

Since the focus of the work is on the European economy, we set the parameters of the model to
reproduce the empirical regularities observed in that area. In particular, we follow a procedure
similar to Ciola et al. (2022b) to set the values of the parameters and then compare the simulated
time series with the quarterly macroeconomic data of the (Euro) Area-wide Model (AWM) database
(Fagan et al., 2005). In this appendix, we show the calibration results, focusing on the definition of
the area-specific parameters and the goodness of fit of the simulated time series to actual data.31

B.1. Parameters calibration
B.1.1

Workers and discount factors

We set the number of workers (N W = 1, 000) to ensure sufficient interactions in the simulated
economy and allow the emergence of endogenous dynamics from the decentralized behaviour of the
heterogeneous agents. At the same time, we estimate the parameters governing the wage equation on
EA quarterly time series between 1970-Q1 and 2017-Q4 (see Appendix B.3). Our results indicate a
moderate persistence in wages (ρ̂W = 0.56), with insiders having approximately the same bargaining
power of outsiders (θ̂W = 0.51). At the same time, observed inflation plays a fundamental role in
anchoring expectations (ι̂W = 0.67).
We assume, as in standard consumption capital asset pricing models (see Cochrane, 2009), the
long-term relationship between households and firms’ discount factors (β C and β F , respectively)
and asset returns:

h
i−1

h i−1
β C = 1 + E rtRF
and β F = 1 + E rtE
,
(69)
where (E[rtRF ] = 0.4%) is the average quarterly real risk-free rate in the EA between 1970-Q1
and 2017-Q4, and (E[rtE ] = 2.0%) is the real quarterly return on risky assets from 2002-Q1 to
2021-Q4, computed as the inflation-adjusted ratio between the gross operating surplus of firms and
the households’ non-financial and financial wealth (source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse).
B.1.2

Firms

Following the findings of van der Werf (2008), we set the same elasticity of substitution in consumption,
capital and energy sectors (σC = σE = σK = 0.5). At the same time, we estimate the depreciation
rate of capital from the ratio between the current-cost depreciation of fixed assets and the net capital
stock in the EA from 1995 to 2020, finding an average annual value of 5% (δK = 0.05/4, source:
AMECO database). On the contrary, we assume for simplicity that the other production inputs
(i.e., energy, labour and fossil fuel) and the consumption good fully depreciate in the current period
(δE = δN = δO = δC = 1).32
We use the symmetric input-output tables at basic prices of Eurostat to estimate the factor shares
of sectoral production functions. The database contains the annual nominal value of intermediate
goods transactions, labour cost, final consumption expenditure and investments in the EA from
2010 to 2019. We divide the 65 main activities of the dataset (European Classification of Economic
Activities – NACE Rev. 2) between consumption and capital sectors according to the weight of final
31We refer the interested reader to Ciola et al. (2022b) for the remaining parameters regarding the matching protocol
and the credit market.
32 This assumption does not change the network of existing market relationships but reflects that, for example, firms
cannot use past or future workers’ time in current production.

39

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

41

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1377 [2022]

consumption expenditure and investments on total demand. Conversely, we define the energy sector
with the categories “Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning” and “Coke and refined petroleum
products” already contained in the original tables.
We compute the sectoral factor shares by dividing the nominal expenditure on intermediate
inputs (i.e., the capital in our framework), labour and energy by total sectoral costs (see Table 4).
Further, we use the energy sector’s consumption of “Mining and quarrying” goods (which contains
“Mining of coal and lignite” and “Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas”) to calculate the
weight of fossil fuels in energy production. Moreover, we use the share of imports to identify the
dependence on foreign inputs (i.e., 89% in 2019, which implies η O = 0.11). Overall, labour is the
main production factor in consumption and capital sectors, while fossil fuels cover the majority of
costs in energy firms (see Table 4). Unsurprisingly, energy services, while necessary, participate only
marginally in production (Kilian, 2008).
Similarly, we use the sectoral classification described above to arrange the latest annual enterprise
statistics produced by Eurostat (arranged in 65 main activities according to NACE Rev. 2) in
consumption, capital and energy enterprises. We assume an adequate number of consumption firms
(N C = 100) to allow sufficient interactions between agents and set the rest of the firms’ population
proportionally to the actual shares observed in the EA (see Table 4). As a result, the consumption
sector covers the majority of firms, followed by capital (N K = 60) and energy (N E = 15) enterprises
and banks (N B = 10).
Table 4: CES production function parameters.

Number of firms
Capital share
Labour share
Energy share
Elasticity of substitution

Nf
AK,f
AN ,f
AE,f
σf

Consumption (C )

Capital (K )

Energy (E )

100
0.25
0.70
0.05
0.50

60

15
0.18
0.18
0.64*
0.50

0.94
0.06
0.50

*: share of fossil fuels in energy production, of which 91% imported from abroad in 2019.

Lastly, since there is no public-available data on the parameters governing the adjustment process
of prices and desired quantities, we fix their values to ensure sufficient persistence in firms’ behaviour
(ζ Q = ζ P = 0.75), avoid excessive volatility in the system (γ P Q = 0.05) and minimize the distance
between simulated and actual time series (see the next section). Further, we choose a relatively
high intensity of choice (ω = 10) to reproduce the observed heterogeneity in firms’ dimensions (see,
among others, Okuyama et al., 1999; Ramsden and Kiss-Haypál, 2000; Axtell, 2001; Gaffeo et al.,
2003).
B.1.3

Public sector

The central bank adjusts the risk-free interest rate using an inertial Taylor rule (12). We set the
quarterly inflation rate target (p∗ = 0.02/4) following the existing literature (Taylor, 1993; Taylor
and Williams, 2010) and the medium-term objective chosen by the European Central Bank. At
the same time, we compute the target unemployment rate as the median value observed in the EA
between 1970 and 2017 (u∗ = 0.087). Lastly, we rely on the empirical analysis of Smets and Wouters
(2005) to determine the remaining parameters of the rule (ρCB = 0.85; λu = 0.11; λp = 1.41).
We use the estimates of Ciola et al. (2022b) to set the target debt to GDP ratio (b∗ = 0.75) and
the adjustment coefficient of public finances (ρG = 0.007). Conversely, we calculate the average
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social expenditure (net of pension transfers and contributions) over GDP in the EA between 1995
and 2020 to set the relative value in the model (ψ G = 0.095, source: Eurostat).

B.2. Goodness of fit of the model
We conclude this appendix by evaluating the goddesses of fit of the model to the EA data. We divide
the analysis between dynamic (i.e., business cycle) and cross-sectional properties of the simulated
time series.
Business cycle The latest version of the Area-wide Model (AWM) database (Fagan et al., 2005)
provides a broad range of quarterly time series on the EA economy between 1970-Q1 and 2017-Q4.
Therefore, we choose this dataset as a benchmark to validate our model on real-world data.
We simulate 1, 000 independent replicas of the model starting from different random seeds and
compute the averages plus the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals of selected statistics. The time
series included in the analysis are the logarithms of real gross domestic product (GDP), gross fixed
capital formation, consumption (CPI) and energy (EPI) price indexes, the unemployment rate and
the risk-free interest rate. Since the focus of the work is on the response of the economy to energy
shocks, we validate our simulations on the short and medium-term properties of real-world business
cycles. Accordingly, we extract the cyclical component of actual and simulated time series through
the Hodrick–Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
Starting from business cycle volatility, the standard deviations of the simulated time series properly
track the values observed in EA data (Table 5). As expected, fluctuations in real investments are
ampler than in aggregate production, even if the model overestimates their size. On the contrary,
energy prices are more stable than the observed time series. This result emerges from the simplifying
assumption of a constant relative price of fossil fuels in the model.33 Indeed, in the real world, the
latter depends more on global than on local factors and is subject to wide fluctuations (Kilian, 2008;
Baumeister and Kilian, 2016). As a result, energy prices, which depend heavily on this production
input (see Table 4), are less volatile in our model than in real-world data.
Table 5: Standard deviation of filtered time series.
EA data
Real GDP
Real investment
Unemployment rate
CPI
EPI
Policy rate

0.011
0.027
0.004
0.010
0.041
0.003

Simulations
Mean
90% C.I.
0.014
0.130
0.012
0.017
0.017
0.002

0.012
0.117
0.011
0.015
0.015
0.002

0.015
0.148
0.013
0.019
0.019
0.003

Note: mean and 90% confidence intervals of simulated data calculated on 1, 000 independent replicas.

Moving to the dynamical properties of the model, the empirical time series show a positive
autocorrelation in the short run, which reverses in the medium term (Figure 11a). The data
generated by the model reflect this behaviour, even though real investments and the unemployment
rate display a lower persistence in the short term, while consumer and energy prices overestimate
the medium-run negative correlation. Similarly, the crosscorrelations of the simulated time series
33We must rely on this assumption since the focus of the work is on the effects of an exogenous increase in the
price of fossil fuels, and we must control its value. Adding a stochastic fossil fuel price would simply increase the
complexity of the analysis without providing further insights.
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with aggregate production follow real-world observations (Figure 11b). However, the model fails
to accurately reproduce the dynamic relationships between real GDP, investments, energy prices
and the central bank policy rate. Nevertheless, even if their size is not correct, the sign of those
correlations is in line with real-world data.
Cross-sectional regularities Having established the capability of our framework to reproduce
the dynamics of the EA business cycle, we illustrate supplementary results produced by the model
that replicate other aspects of real-world economies. To improve the robustness of our analysis, we
focus only on the last observation of each independent replica, thus allowing us to investigate the
unconditional behaviour of the simulated time series.
First, our theoretical framework can generate two common empirical regularities, namely the
Philips curve and the Okun’s law (see Figure 12). In particular, the model can reproduce, even
without assuming it, the inverse relationship of inflation and real GDP with the unemployment rate.
Moreover, the Philips curve follows recent developments in its shape, with lower responsiveness
of inflation to changes in the unemployment rate than in the past (see Negro et al., 2020, for an
empirical analysis and a discussion on the causes of that shift). On the contrary, the elasticity of
unemployment with real GDP (−0.40) is in line with recent estimates of its value in EA countries
(ECB, 2011).
Second, a prominent feature of our model is the introduction of heterogeneous interacting agents.
Accordingly, that allows us to assess the distributional properties of the simulated economy (Figure
13). The Gini index computed on disposable income slightly overestimates the average level observed
in the EA (0.39 against 0.30). Nevertheless, the distributive effects of government transfers replicate
the real-world values, with a reduction of 14 and 11 percentage points in simulated and EA data,
respectively (OECD, 2008). Moreover, the Gini index increases with unemployment (Parker, 1998),
as shown in the right pane of Figure 13. In other words, inequality follows business cycle fluctuations,
reaching its maximum level during recessions.
Lastly, since the energy sector plays a fundamental role in our model, we analyse its unconditional
behaviour (Figure 14). As expected, the demand for energy increases with aggregate production
with an estimated elasticity of 73%, in line with the empirical results of Burke and Csereklyei (2016).
Moreover, the aggregate expenditure on fossil fuels over nominal GDP fluctuates around the 2.3%
average value observed in the EA between 2016 and 2020 (Figure 14, right pane).

B.3. Estimation of the wage equation
We conclude this appendix by describing the procedure we follow to estimate the parameters of the
wage equation ((29) and (30)) on EA quarterly time series between 1970-Q1 and 2017-Q4 (data
source: AWM database, see Fagan et al., 2005). A natural way to infer the required values would be
to estimate the empirical model:
wt = β0 + β1 zt−1 + β2 Ut−1 + β3 pt−1 + et

(70)

where wt and zt−1 are the growth rates of the nominal wage per worker and labour productivity
(measured as the ratio between real GDP and total employment), Ut−1 is the unemployment rate
and pt−1 the consumer price index inflation. Nevertheless, the time series are not stationary except
for labour productivity.34 Accordingly, we estimate the following Error Correction Model (ECM):
∆wt = β0 + β1 wt−1 + β2 zt−2 + β3 Ut−2 + β4 pt−2 + β5 ∆wt−1 + β6 ∆zt−1 + β7 ∆Ut−1 + β8 ∆pt−1 + et (71)
34 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on nominal wage growth, unemployment and inflation rates does not reject
the null hypothesis of unit root at 10% level of significance with a p-value of 0.4561, 0.1169 and 0.5788, respectively.
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(a) Time series autocorrelation

(b) Time series cross-correlation with real aggregate production.

Figure 11: Autocorrelation and cross-correlation structures of main aggregate variables: simulated against
empirical data.
Note: auto- and cross-correlation functions of simulated (blue error bars) and US time series (red lines). Median and
90% confidence intervals of simulated data calculated on 1, 000 independent replicas.
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Figure 12: Phillips curves and Okun’s law.
Note: quarterly inflation rate (left pane) and real GDP growth rate (right pane) against unemployment rate. Results
calculated on the last observations of 1, 000 independent replicas.

Figure 13: Gini index and business cycle.
Note: Gini index before and after public social expenditure (left pane) and for different levels of unemployment (right
pane). Results calculated on the last observations of 1, 000 independent replicas.

where ∆ identifies the first difference of a variable and we add one lag of the dependent variable to
control for residuals autocorrelation.
We conclude by rewriting (29) and (30) in terms of nominal wage growth rate:
h
i
wt = ρW + (1 − ρW ) θW (1 + zt−1 ) + (1 − θW )(1 − Ut−1 ) + ιW pt−1 + (1 − ιW )p∗
(72)
d /N emp with the gross growth rate of labour
where we substitute the relative demand for labour Nt−1
t−1
productivity 1 + zt−1 because of the lack of empirical data. In other words, we overcome the problem
of insufficient observations by assuming that the growth rate of labour productivity can be used
as a proxy for the bargaining power of insiders. Indeed, they would capture all the increase in
labour productivity if they had complete control over wage negotiations. Lastly, we calculate the
unconditional estimators of the parameters from (71) and (72):

θ̂W =

β̂2 /β̂1
β̂2
β̂3 − β̂2
β̂4
=
, ρ̂W = 1 −
and ι̂W = − .
β̂2 /β̂1 − β̂3 /β̂1
β̂2 − β̂3
β̂1
β̂1

(73)
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Figure 14: Aggregate production and energy demand.
Note: Unconditional (long-term) relationship between energy demand and aggregate production (left pane). Simulated
distribution of fossil fuel expenditure over GDP (right pane). Results calculated on the last observations of 1, 000
independent replicas.

Table 6 shows the results of the estimation, which indicate a moderate persistence in wages
(ρ̂W = 0.56), with insiders having approximately the same bargaining power of outsiders (θ̂W = 0.51).
Lastly, observed inflation plays a fundamental role in anchoring expectations (ι̂W = 0.67).
Table 6: Wage equation.
OLS, using observations 1971:3–2017:4 (T = 186).
Dependent variable: ∆wt .

const
wt−1
zt−2
Ut−2
pt−2
∆wt−1
∆zt−1
∆Ut−1
∆pt−1

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-ratio

p-value

0.0155
−0.6473
0.1464
−0.1382
0.4331
−0.3133
−0.1859
−0.3732
0.2322

0.0032
0.0942
0.0974
0.0286
0.0905
0.0695
0.0722
0.2032
0.0658

4.792
−6.871
1.504
−4.834
4.785
−4.511
−2.576
−1.836
3.532

0.0000
0.0000
0.1344
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0108
0.0679
0.0005

Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R2
F (8, 180)

−0.0002
0.0039
0.5007
22.5622

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R2
P-value(F )

0.0064
0.0046
0.4785
0.0000
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C.

Model parameters

#

Description

Name

Value

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Number of workers
Discount rate households
Memory parameter
Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth
Discount rate firms
Dividend payout ratio firms
Wage stickiness
Insider-outsider bargaining power
Inflation anchoring
Labour depreciation
Number of C-firms
Factor share capital (C-firms)
Factor share labour (C-firms)
Factor share energy (C-firms)
Depreciation rate of consumption goods
Elasticity of substitution (C-firms)
Number of E-firms
Factor share capital (E-firms)
Factor share labour (E-firms)
Factor share natural resource (E-firms)
Depreciation rate of energy services
Elasticity of substitution (E-firms)
Number of K-firms
Factor share labour (K-firms)
Factor share energy (K-firms)
Depreciation rate of physical capital
Elasticity of substitution (K-firms)
Size of exploration
Speed of adjustment: quantity
Speed of adjustment: price
Intensity of choice
Foreign natural resource expenditure over GDP
Depreciation rate of foreign natural resource
Share of foreign natural resource going to E-firms
Number of banks
Capital adequacy ratio
Risk weighting
Maximum single exposure to borrowers
Interest rate setting parameter
Interest rate setting parameter
Interest rate setting parameter
Share of loans repaid at each time-step
Number of entrepreneurs
Number of consumers
Inflation target
Target unemployment rate
Steady state real interest rate
Monetary policy rule weights: inflation
Monetary policy rule weights: unemployment
Speed of adjustment of the monetary policy rule
Target debt-GDP ratio
Speed of adjustment to target debt-GDP ratio
Share of social expenditures
Maximum number of new partners (C-market)
Maximum number of new partners (E-market)
Maximum number of new partners (K-market)
Maximum number of new partners (labour market)
Maximum number of new partners (credit market)
Initial wage rate
Time length

NW
βC
ε
χ
βF
µF
ρW
θW
ιW
δN
NC
AN ,C
AK,C
AE,C
δC
σC
NE
AN ,E
AK,E
AO,E
δE
σE
NK
AN ,K
AE,K
δK
σK
γP Q
ζQ
ζP
ω
νO
δO
ηO
NB
γB
ωB
κB
ϱB
ρB
ιB
θB
NF
NH
p∗
u∗
r∗
λp
λu
ρCB
b∗
ρG
ψG
ZC
ZE
ZK
ZN
ZB
W0
T

1000
0.996
βC
1 − βC
0.980
1 − βF
0.56
0.51
0.67
1
100
0.25
0.70
0.05
1
0.50
100
0.18
0.18
0.64
1
0.50
60
0.94
0.06
0.05/4
0.50
0.05
0.75
0.75
10
0.023
1.00
0.09
10
0.08
1
0.25
0.029/4
0.017/4
0.001/4
0.0125
NC + NE + NK + NB
NW + NF
0.02/4
0.087
1/β C − 1
1.41
0.11
0.85
0.75
0.007
0.094
0.25
4
4
10
0.20
10
5000

Total number of non-composite parameters

52
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